A mean field type differential game is a mathematical model of a large system of identical agents under mean-field interaction controlled by two players with opposite purposes. We study the case when the dynamics of each agent is given by ODE and the players can observe the distribution of the agents. We construct suboptimal strategies and prove the existence of the value function.
Introduction
The paper is concerned with the deterministic mean field type control system governed by two players. We assume that the purposes of the players are opposite. This problem can be called zero-sum mean field type differential game.
Originally, the theory of differential games deals with the finite dimensional systems controlled by two players. It started with the seminal work by Isaacs [24] . The mathematical analysis of zero-sum differential games was developed in 1970s (see [4] , [21] , [22] , [29] , [40] and references therein). There are several equivalent approaches to the formalization of the zero-sum differential games. First one developed by Krasovskii, Subbotin and their followers (see [29] , [36] ) presumes that the players are informed about the current state of the system and form their controls stepwise. Krasovskii and Subbotin called this approach feedback. However, in fact the realization of such strategy requires a short-term memory. Within the framework of the second approaches it is assumed that the player's strategy is a nonanticipative response on a control of his/her partner [21] , [40] . Note that value function of the zero-sum differential game is a viscosity (minimax) solution to the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi equation [4] , [36] .
The mean field type control theory is concerned with large systems of agents optimizing their common payoff in the limit case when the number of agents tends to infinity. The main assumptions of the mean field approach are: the agents are identical and the dynamics of each agent depends on his/her state and on the distribution of the states of other agents. This leads to control problem in the space of probabilities. First mean field type control problems were considered in [1] . Note that the mean field type control theory is a counterpart of the mean field game theory proposed in [30] , [31] , [23] . The difference between these approaches is that within the framework of mean field games each agent maximizes his/her outcome.
Nowadays, the mean field type control systems are studied primary for the case of dynamics given by SDE (see [6] and reference therein). Forward-backward stochastic differential equation for mean field type control systems were studied in [3] , [8] , [13] . Dynamic programming principle for these systems was also developed (see [5] , [7] , [32] ). The existence theorem for the optimal control is proved in [25] . The link between mean field control theory and Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs in the space of probabilities was studied in [33] , [34] . Additionally, we mention the papers [14] , [15] , [35] devoted especially to the deterministic mean field type control problem.
Mean field type differential games arise quite naturally when we examine mean field type control systems assuming that the dynamics of each agents is affected by a disturbances. The pursuit-evasion game where a large group of pursuers tries to chase a large group of evaders can be also treated within the framework of mean field type differential games. Mean field type differential games can be regarded as continuoustime dynamical games in the space of probabilities. Such games appear also in the analysis of differential games with incomplete information [9] , [12] . In the last case the dynamics of the system does not depend explicitly on the probability distribution.
The mean field type differential games were previously considered in [20] . In that paper the open-loop solution of the differential game was studied for the case when dynamics is given by SDE.
Aiming to develop the feedback approach to mean field type differential games we assume that the players are informed about the state of the game. Recall that the state of the mean field type differential game is a probability describing the current distribution of all agents. We apply the methodology developed by Krasovskii and Subbotin to deterministic mean field type differential games. The main idea of this approach is to
• introduce the notions of u-and v-stability,
• given a u-stable (respectively, v-stable) function, construct a suboptimal strategy of the first (respectively, second) player
• prove that there exists a value function which is simultaneously u-and v-stable.
In the paper to prove the existence theorem we adapt the programmed iteration method first proposed in [16] , [17] , [37] . Originally, programmed iteration method served as an analytical tool for computing the value function of a finite dimensional differential game. Note that the close construction were used in [10] , [11] where the numerical schemes for differential games were developed. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the general definitions and notations used throughout the paper. In Section 3 we define the feedback strategies, extend the notion of stability to mean field case and formulate the main results. Section 4 is devoted to the construction of suboptimal strategies based on extremal shift. Finally, in Section 5 we develop the programmed iteration method for mean field type differential game and prove the existence theorem for the value function.
General notions and definitions
If (X, ρ X ) is a separable metric space satisfying the Radon property, then denote by P(X) the set of probabilities on X. Here and below we assume that (X, ρ X ) is endowed by Borel σ-algebra. Further, let P 2 (X) be the set of all probabilities m on X such that, for some (and, thus, any) x * ∈ X,
Denote by W 2 the 2-Wasserstein metric on P 2 (X) defined as follows: if m 1 , m 2 ∈ P 2 (X), then
Here Π(m 1 , m 2 ) denotes the set of plans between m 1 , m 2 , i.e., Π(m 1 , m 2 ) is a set of probabilities π ∈ P(X × X) such that for any measurable
Note that if X is Polish, then P 2 (X) is also Polish. The sets P(X), P 2 (X) coincide when X is a compact. Moreover, in this case P 2 (X) is compact and W 2 metricizes the narrow convergence [2] . Now, let (X, ρ X ) and (Y, ρ Y ) be separable metric spaces satisfying Radon property. The function b :
is measurable. Here and below we write b(x, dy) instead of b(x)(dy). Denote by WM(X, Y ) the space of weakly measurable functions b from X to P(Y ). The set of usual measurable functions is embedded into WM(X, Y ) in the following way: if h : X → Y is measurable, then put
Here δ y stands for the Dirac measure concentrated in y. If (Z, ρ Z ) is also a separable space satisfying the Radon property, ξ ∈ P(Y ), ζ ∈ P(Z) then let ξζ stand for the product of probabilities, i.e., ξζ is a probability on Y ×Z defined by the rule:
, then denote by bc the weakly measurable function from X to P(Y × Z) given by: for x ∈ X,
Let m be a finite measure on X, b ∈ WM(X, Y ). Denote by m ⋆ b the probability on X × Y given by the following rule:
Further, denote by Λ(X, m, Y ) the quotient space of WM(X, Y ) w.r.t. equivalence given by coincidence m-a.e., i.e., b 1 is equivalent to
Notice, that if X and Y are Polish, then the space Λ(X, Y, m) is Polish. The set of measurable functions from X to Y is dense in Λ(X, m, Y ) [41] . Moreover, when X and Y are metric compact, this property is inherited by Λ(X, m, Y ).
Let π be a measure on X × Y , then denote by π(·|x) (respectively, π(·|y)) the disintegration of π with respect to its marginal on X (respectively, Y ). We refer to [19, III.70] for the the existence result of the disintegration of the probability.
If
For simplicity we assume periodic boundary conditions, i.e., the phase space is
With some abuse of notation, for x(·), y(·) ∈ C, we set
Further, for t ∈ [0, T ], denote by e t the evaluation operator from C to T d defined by the following rule: if x(·) ∈ C, then e t (x(·)) x(t).
Since, for every
Below we call any function of time taking values in P 2 (T d ) a flow of probabilities. Denote by M the set of continuous functions from
Assume that the motion of each agent is given by the ordinary differential equation
Here m(t) stands for the distribution of all agents; U (respectively, V ) denotes the control space of the first (receptively, second) player; f is a function defined on
Integrating formally (5), we can write down the equation on m(t) in the following form:
Here · stands for x. We assume that the controls u(t, x, m) (respectively, v(t, x, m)) are chosen by the first (respectively, second) player to minimize (respectively, maximize) the objective function g(m(T )).
We assume that
• the control sets U and V are metric compacts;
• the functions f and g are continuous;
• the function f is Lipschitz continuous w.r.t x and m;
• the Isaacs condition holds true:
In the paper we use relaxed controls.
be space of relaxed controls of the first and second players respectively. Here λ stands for the Lebesgue measure on [0, T ]. Denote by U 0 (respectively, V 0 ) the set of measurable functions from [0, T ] to U (respectively, V ). Notice that an element of U (respectively V ) can be regarded as a contant control of the first (respectively, second) player. Using this and the embedding given by (1), we assume that
Denote by W the set of joint relaxed controls of both players on (2), without loss of generality we assume that
Note that x(·, s, y, m(·), η) is a motion of a representative player produced by the relaxed control of both players η.
C the operator which assigns to each pair (y, η) the motion x(·, s, y, m(·), η). Now let us introduce the sets of distributions of controls. Put
The set A (respectively, B) is the set of distributions of relaxed controls of the first (respectively, second) player; while D is the set of distributions of joint relaxed controls of both players. In some cases we will assume that the players use constant controls. such that κ(x) is concentrated on U × V 0 , i.e., in this case we admit only usual controls of the second player. Analogously, let
We say that m(·) = m(·, s, m * , κ) ∈ M is a flow of probabilities generated by distribution of joint relaxed controls of the players κ if there exists a probability γ ∈ P 2 (C) such that 
Main result
We consider the concept of feedback strategies going back to formalization of zerosum differential games proposed by Krasovskii and Subbotin. In this case the original differential game is replaced with the couple of games, namely, upper and lower games. In the upper game the first player uses feedback strategy and forms his control stepwise, when the second player forms his control arbitrarily. In the lower game the players change their places. If the upper and lower value functions coincide, then we say that there exists a value function of the original game.
The strategy of the first player is a function u :
is called a strategy of the second player. Let us start with the upper game. Let u be a strategy of the first player, t 0 ∈ [0, T ] be an initial time, m 0 ∈ P 2 (T d ) be an initial distribution of players, and let
be a partition of
Definition 2. We say that a flow of probabilities m(·) :
is generated by t 0 , m 0 , u and ∆ if m(t 0 ) = m 0 and there exist distributions of controls
We denote the set of flows of probabilities generated by t 0 , m 0 , u, and ∆ by
If the first player uses the strategy u and corrects his/her control at times of partition ∆, then his/her outcome is evaluated by the value
Analogously, if t 0 is an initial time, m 0 is an initial distribution of players, v is a second player's strategy, ∆ is a partition of the time interval [t 0 , T ], one can introduce the set of flows of probabilities generated by t 0 , m 0 , ∆ and v. Denote it by X 2 (t 0 , m 0 , v, ∆). The value
provides an evaluation of the outcome when the system starts at (t 0 , m 0 ) and the second player chooses the strategy v and the partition ∆.
The upper value of the game at (t 0 , m 0 ) is equal to
The lower value of the game is defined in the same way:
Clearly,
If Γ 1 = Γ 2 , then we say that the game has a value.
To formulate the main result we require a notions of u-and v-stability.
Definition 3. We say that a lower semicontinuous function m(r, s, m  *  , κ) ).
If ψ 2 is a v-stable function, then
One way to prove the existence and compute the value function is the programmed iteration method first proposed for zero-sum differential game by Chentsov [16] .
Let
ω(r, m(r, s, µ, κ)).
Further, for k = 1, 2, . . ., set
Analogously, let us introduce the operator Ψ :
Theorem 2. There exists a value function of the mean field type differential game Γ. It is simultaneously u-and v-stable. For any
Extremal shift rule
In this section we prove Theorem 1. To this end, given the u-stable function ψ 1 and ε > 0, we construct the strategy u ε such that, for a sufficiently fine partition, the corresponding outcome is estimated by ψ 1 with an error vanishing when ε → 0.
Since the function f is continuous, the sets
Therefore, for all s
Without loss of generality, one can assume that ̟ f , ̟ g are nondecreasing on [0, +∞). Moreover, we assume that ̟ f is even. Further, denote by L the Lipschitz constant for the function f , i.e., for any
Let ρ(ε, t) be equal to ̺(ε, t) (ε + ̟ 2 (ε)t)e 4Lt .
Given
Here x ′ ∈ x, y ′ ∈ y are such that x ′ − y ′ = x − y . Notice that one can choose the functionû andv to be measurable.
The strategy u ε introduced below realizes the extremal shift rule initially proposed for finite dimensional differential games in [29] . We adapt for the mean field case the variant of this method borrowed from [28] . Let (s, m) be a position from
Now, let π be an optimal plan between m and ν, π(·|x) be its disintegration with respect to m. Define the first player's strategy u ε by the rule: for
By construction we have that u ε [s, m] ∈ A c . Below we use the following unfolding of the solution of (7) .
Notice that ifx(·) solves (17), then x(·) given by x(t) [x(t)] solves (7) for y = [y ′ ]. Furthermore, the definition off and (12) yield
Here ̟ 2 is introduced by (14) .
Proof. Pick x ′ * ∈ x * and y ′ * ∈ y * such that
Using Lipschitz continuity of the function f w.r.t. x and m, the definition off , estimate (18) , the inequality x ′ * − y ′ * ≤ √ d and the fact that m(·), ν(·) ∈ M C 0 , we conclude that
Here ̟ 1 is defined by (13) For each u ∈ U, v ∈ V , the following inequality holds:
Using the choice of u * and v * , we get
Combining this, (19) , (20) and definition of ̟ 2 (see (14)), we get the conclusion of the Lemma.
, π be an optimal plan between m * and ν * , π(·|x), π(·|y) be its disintegration with respect to m * and ν * respectively,
, we have that, for each x ∈ T d , there exists a disintegration of κ(x) with respect to α * (x) that is an element of WM(U, V). With some abuse of notation denote it by κ(x, u). Analogously, let ϑ(x, v) stand for the disintegration of ϑ(x) with respect to β * (x).
ϑ(x * , y * ) ϑ(x * ,v(s, x * , y * , m * )).
Notice that, for each x * , y * ∈ T d ,κ(x * , y * ) ∈ P(V),θ(x * , y * ) ∈ P(U). Let Ξ be a probability on
Obviously, the marginal distribution of Ξ on
To clarify the link between the probability Ξ and the distributions of controls κ and ϑ let us introduce the following projection of
We have that P
Let T r,s m(·),ν(·) be the operator from
This, (24) and Definition 1 yield that
is a plan between m(r) and ν(r). To simplify notation put
y(x * , y * , ξ) x(r, s, y * , ν(·), ξδv (s,x * ,y * ,m * ) ).
Using (23), (25) and definition ofπ, we get
Since m(·), ν(·) ∈ M C 0 , taking into account designations (26), (27) , one can estimate x(x * , y * , ζ) −ŷ(x * , y * , ξ)
2 by Lemma 1. This implies the inequality
Since π is an optimal plan between m * and ν * we obtain the conclusion of the Lemma.
Proof of Theorem 1.
Recall (see (16) ) that the strategy
Here π i is an optimal plan between m i and ν i ; while ν i is a probability on
Using Lemma 2, we get
From (28) and Definition 3 we conclude that
Using (29) and the definition of ̺ (see (15)), we obtain the following estimate:
Thus, for any partition ∆ such that d(∆) ≤ ε,
Since
This proves the first statement of the theorem. To prove the second part it suffices to replace g with −g and interchange the players.
Programmed iteration method
This section is concerned with the proof of Theorem 2. First, let us prove the following auxiliary statement.
satisfying the following properties:
Moreover, if µ i = µ, then one can choose β i = β.
to some γ ∈ P(C). Moreover, γ is concentrated on the set of C 0 -Lipschitz continuous functions from [0, T ] to T d . Put ν(t) e t# γ. By (4) we have that
It remains to prove that
To this end let us show that ν(s) = µ and γ = traj * # τ , where traj *
The compactness of T d and W implies that
Let φ ∈ C b (C). Without loss of generality we can consider only the case when φ is 1-Lipschitz continuous. We have that
The following lemmas are concerned with the sequences {ω k } and {ω k } Recall that {ω k } is defined by (8) and (9), whereas the sequence {ω k } is given by (10), (11) . Denote by LCF (respectively, UCF) the set of all lower (respectively, upper) semicountinuous functions from
Lemma 4. For any k ∈ N ∪ {0},
Proof. We prove only the statement that ω 0 ∈ LCF, as the statements for ω k , k ∈ N and ω k can be obtained similarly. Let
Let a sequence of distributions {β ε,i } ⊂ B c be such that µ i ⋆ β ε,i converges narrowly to µ ⋆ β ε . The existence of this sequence is ensured by Lemma 3. Obviously,
By Lemma 3 and the continuity of g there exists a distribution of controls
Using (33), we get lim inf
Passing to the limit when ε → 0, we conclude that the function ω 0 is lower semicontinuous.
Lemma 5. There exists a limit
The function ω * is u-stable.
Proof. First, notice that
Moreover,
is well-defined. The function ω * is v-stable and
The proof of this Lemma is analogous to the proof of Lemma 5 and Corollary 1. To prove the lemma it suffices to replace g with −g and interchange the players.
The further construction requires the formalization of the mean field type differential game in the class of strategies with memory.
Let M s denote the set of continuous functions 
. Denote the set of flows of probabilities generated by s, µ and p by X 1 (s, µ, p). Put
Note that if u is a feedback strategy, ∆ is a partition of [s, T ], then the corresponding stepwise strategy of the first player is given by
The stepwise strategies with memory of the second player are introduced in the same way. 
The set of flows of probabilities generated by s, µ and q is denoted by X 2 (s, µ, q).
. Combining this inequality with (39), we get
Lemma 7. For any s ∈ [0, T ], µ ∈ P 2 (T d ), Γ 1 (s, µ) = Γ 1 (s, µ) = Γ 2 (s, µ) = ω * (s, µ).
Proof. Given ε > 0, for any s, µ, we define the sequence of stepwise strategies with memory of the second player {q This implies that, for any z < ω * (s, µ),
Hence, Γ 2 (s, µ) ≥ ω * (s, µ).
This, Corollary 1 together with inequality (40) give the conclusion of the lemma.
Lemma 8. For all s ∈ [0, T ], µ ∈ P 2 (T d ), the following inequality holds:
The proof of this lemma is analogous to the proof of the previous lemma. It is based on the sequence {ω k } introduced by (10) and (11).
Proof of Theorem 2. The conclusion of Theorem 2 directly follows from Lemmas 5, 6, 7 and 8.
Conclusion
In the paper we construct the feedback strategies for the zero-sum first-order mean field type differential game. The construction relies on the notions of u-and v-stability. Furthermore, we prove the existence of the value function that is simultaneously uand v-stable. These results can be regarded as a mean field analog of the KrasovskiiSubbotin theory for the finite dimensional differential games.
In the case of finite-dimensional differential game the u-stable (respectively, v-stable) function is a super-(respectively, sub-) solution to the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi PDE. The extension of this result to the case of mean field type differential games is the subject of future work. Note that Cosso and Pham studied the second order mean field type differential game using nonanticipative strategy (see [18] ). In particular, they proved that the value function in this case is a viscosity solution of the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi equation. This raises the question of the equivalence of the feedback formalization and the approach based on nonaticipative strategies.
In the paper we restrict our attention to the case of zero-sum games. Note that the case of nonzero-sum games is more complicated. In particular, the existence of Nash equilibria for finite dimensional differential games is proved only within the punishment approach [27] , [39] . Apparently, the punishment strategies can be also used to construct Nash equilibria for mean field type differential games.
